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Neuroeconomics is currently one of the fastest moving band-
wagons in systems neuroscience. If you are a neuroscientist
trying to decide whether or not to clamber aboard, or, if on board
already, whether to jump off, or if you are just trying to work out
where the bandwagon is going and whether it might be about to
hit you, then a couple of weeks with Neuroeconomics: Decision
making and the Brain might enable you to make a decision. For
neuroeconomists, behavior consists of decisions and learning
how best to make decisions. Neuroeconomics attempts to
describe not just why one choice might be the one to take but
also to elucidate the neural mechanisms that bring about such
decisions. Of course, as with any bandwagon, it always feels
important to keep up with what everyone else is doing—and,
by reading Neuroeconomics, you will start to understand why
this may be so. The book has a major emphasis on under-
standing one of the most important influences on one’s own
decision making, namely the decisions taken by others.
There is, in some quarters, confusion about what constitutes
neuroeconomics. The inclusion of chapters by two Nobel laure-
ates, V. Smith and Kahneman, not to mention the 29 other chap-
ters, makes clear from the outset that this discipline is a serious
branch of scholarly enquiry. Several degrees of separation
distinguish it from neuromarketing—the attempt to use neuroi-
maging tools, such as functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), to measure preferences at a deeper level than might be
revealed by questionnaires alone in order to find the best way
to sell things. For many neuroscientists, the appeal of neuroe-
conomics is that it provides formal frameworks to describe the
behavioral output of several major brain divisions including
parts of frontal, cingulate, and parietal cortex, striatum, and,
for want of a better word, the limbic system. Visual and motor
psychophysics provide a framework in which to understand
the operation of the visual and motor systems, and in a sense
the bold claim implicit in Neuroeconomics is that if you want to
understand what approximately half of the forebrain is doing
then you need an account of how and why decisions are
made.
Two further important claims are examined in Neuroeconom-
ics. First, it is argued that because economics and social
sciences have already been forced to think hard about how deci-
sions should be made (so-called ‘‘normative’’ approaches to
decision making) and to measure how decisions are actually
made (‘‘descriptive’’ approaches), these disciplines offer new150 Neuron 63, July 30, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.perspectives on what goals brain processes might be trying to
accomplish. Second, it is contended that since economic deci-
sions are the product of neural processes then greater knowl-
edge of such processes should endow economists with greater
power to predict decisions.
That the perspective offered by neuroeconomics provides
new insights into neural data has been evident since publication
of a study by Platt and Glimcher (1999) that many consider
a foundation for the field (reviewed in Platt and Padoa-Schiop-
pa’s chapter). For two decades there had been a debate about
the function of brain regions such as the lateral intraparietal
(LIP) area. Everyone agreed that LIP neuron activity increased
when monkeys paid attention to stimuli to which they were about
to make saccades. While one camp argued that the activity
reflected attentional modulation of sensory processing another
camp submitted that it reflected intentional processes related
to motor preparation of the saccade. Platt and Glimcher showed
that the firing of LIP neurons reflected both the probability that
a simple event, the appearance of a visual target for an eye
movement, would occur in their receptive field and the magni-
tude of gain associated with that event in terms of food reward.
According to the seventeenth century philosopher Pascal, the
importance or value of a possible event is a function of its prob-
ability of occurrence and the magnitude of the gain it entails.
Monkeys therefore have to decide to where in the visual field
it was most valuable to pay attention and parietal neurons
encoded the expected value to be assigned to the sensorimotor
transformations that would take the monkey’s eyes to that loca-
tion in space.
Platt and Glimcher were careful to keep constant the magni-
tude of gain and the probability throughout fairly long periods of
their experiments. Of course, in the real world the probability of
one event or another may well change. Corrado and colleagues,
in a thoughtful chapter discussing the pitfalls and advantages of
various ways of describing behavior, review their suggestion of
applying an exponential filter to the recent history of rewards
associated with each decision option in order to estimate their
value. In other words, the estimate of an option’s value will
depend heavily on the recent rewards associated with it and to
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and colleagues (2007) have demonstrated that the extent of the
past reward history that should exert this influence is not fixed
but depends instead on the volatility of the reward environment;
when the environment is more volatile, the past is a less reliable
guide to the future and people adjust their value estimates to be
based on only the most recent history of rewards.
When the value of spatial choices is estimated using Corrado
and colleagues’ method it correlates with the firing rates of LIP
neurons encoding the positions of the possible choices the
monkey might make. Volatility changes are also associated
with activity in the anterior cingulate cortex as measured with
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). It is clear from
single neuron data that information about reward history is
present in a number of frontal areas that may influence action
selection (Lee’s and Wang’s chapter). Many of the chapters in
Neuroeconomics are coauthored by researchers with different
backgrounds. Lee’s and Wang’s combination of computational
modeling and neurophysiology enables them to provide a review
not just of neuron firing patterns but also an excellent summary
of how such patterns may actually instantiate the making of
a decision.
A hallmark of Neuroeconomics is a preoccupation with
bounded, unambiguous descriptions of probability, risk, and
uncertainty. Perhaps nowhere is this clearer than in the chapter
by Bossaerts and colleagues. These authors argue, from the
foundations of financial analysis, that while activity in some insula
regions is correlated with the probability of reward, activity in
another insula area is correlated with the risk associated with
reward—the expectation of reward variance or squared reward
prediction error. Both reward probability and reward risk are
also encoded in dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental
area (VTA) when cues associated with reward are shown to
monkeys (Schultz’s chapter). Such approaches are important,
first, because they suggest alternative ways in which brain
regions might be encoding the values of choices—regions such
as the insula may encode a potential choice in terms of its
mean return and variance/risk. Second, knowledge of the ex-
pected variance in reward may be important during learning in
order to scale activity in response to outcomes, for example
when there has been a prediction error. Such prediction errors
appear to drive learning because they indicate that previous
predictions about the world were incorrect but a learner might
not update a prediction much even in response to a prediction
error if risk, the expected squared reward prediction error, is
high. There is now evidence that risk-based scaling of VTA
neuron responses to rewards occurs.
One implicit connecting strand in Neuroeconomics is the
strong reliance on formal modeling. While a normative approach
is central to economics, the theories that inform interpretations
of neural data in Neuroeconomics are not always solely derived
from this discipline. Indeed, it is to psychology or even computer
science that neuroscientists have traditionally turned for
accounts of behavior to then be related to neural activity. While
it may have its detractors, the idea that the dopaminergic system
encodes reward prediction errors is surely one of the most influ-
ential to have emerged recently in systems neuroscience and
that influence is largely due to the careful exploitation of para-digms devised by behavioral learning theorists. This strand of
research and the important contribution that has been made to
it by computational modeling is illuminated by Niv and Montague
and by Doya and Kimura, while Balleine and colleagues provide
an excellent complimentary review of the origin of related ideas
in psychology.
While it is evident that thinking carefully about decision making
has been of benefit to neuroscientists what has their involvement
with neuroscience gained economists (an issue intelligently
addressed in chapters from an economist’s perspective by
Bernheim, and from a psychologist’s by Gallistel)? Economics
has traditionally assumed that it has no useful access to internal
variables, instead relying on observed behavior to impute the
relationship between external factors and decision making. If
the aim of economics is to predict choices then the question
becomes whether or not knowledge of brain activity makes
such predictions any easier or more accurate. In an important
paper reviewed by both Fox and Poldrack and by Bossaerts,
Berns and colleagues (2008) used fMRI to measure activity in
several regions associated with valuation when people were pre-
sented with only one option. In subsequent testing, free choices
made between options close in ranking were predicted signifi-
cantly better by fMRI measurements in nonchoice trials than
by previous behavioral measurements.
Another test of whether neuroeconomics will be of assistance
to economists is whether it can adjudicate between competing
economic theories. Delgado and Phelps and colleagues, who
coauthor and author chapters, respectively, have tried to do
just that to explain why people are prepared to pay more for an
item, given its value, in auctions (‘‘overbidding,’’ Delgado et al.,
2008) . Interindividual variation in ventral striatal activity on occa-
sions when bidders were unsuccessful was correlated with
variation in overbidding, particularly when bidding was con-
ducted in a social context. The authors argued that contrary to
some accounts of overbidding it is fear of losing in a social
context that drives overbidding.
These findings also highlight an area where neuroscience and
psychology have already had an influence on economic thinking,
namely on the issue of how emotions influence choice behavior.
One of the precursors to the neuroeconomic movement was
the work of Damasio and colleagues who made the direct
connection between the poor decision making and the social
and emotional changes of patients with ventromedial prefrontal
lesions (summarized in Damasio’s chapter). Such findings have
prompted some to favor a dual process model in which so-called
cool, rational, deliberative thinking is in competition against
automatic, emotional, impulsive urges (Loewenstein et al., 2008).
The degree of separation between such systems, however, is
a matter of contention. For instance, in two chapters, the func-
tion of anterior insula is described as mediating emotional repre-
sentations which guide choice behavior (Fehr, and Sanfey, and
Dorris), while another relates such activity to the encoding of
risk (Bossaerts et al.). The difficulties in teasing apart what
constitutes an emotional or an economic perspective, and how
this affects interpretation of neuroimaging data, are patiently
explained by Phelps.
Ultimately, the argument that knowledge of brain processes
might augment an understanding of economic decision makingNeuron 63, July 30, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 151
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primacy over behavior. While many chapters inNeuroeconomics
concentrate on correlative techniques such as fMRI or single-
unit recording that can identify covariation in behavior and brain
activity, there are relatively few examples of manipulation of
brain activity in order to cause behavioral changes. In one excep-
tion, Fehr describes how transcranial magnetic stimulation
(TMS) over the right but not left lateral prefrontal cortex, used
to transiently disrupt brain activity, affects choices in a two-
person decision making game; it increases ‘‘self-interested’’
choices which benefit the subject but do not punish the partner’s
unfair offers. Evaluating causality should be an important consid-
eration for future neuroeconomic studies (see also Balleine
et al.’s chapter for elegant examples of how lesion studies
have helped elucidate dissociable aspects of value processing).
The quest to uncover how decision making occurs in interac-
tive or social contexts has generated considerable excitement in
recent years and is a theme particularly well covered in Neuroe-
conomics. Fehr concentrates on how many decisions appear
to be motivated not solely by a desire to maximize the value of
the outcome for the decision maker but instead reflect an interest
in how the outcome will affect others. Such ‘‘other regarding
preferences’’ or ‘‘social preferences’’ concerning outcomes are
associated with activation in brain regions such as the VTA
and striatum in the same way that consideration of potential
rewards for oneself activate such regions (Moll et al., 2006). It
is not yet clear whether such activation reflects the consequence
of having adopted another’s perspective or a premium that is
placed on fairness.
An essential ingredient of the games used to study social pref-
erence is their ‘‘one-shot’’ nature. In such games, players play
just a single round with any other player because the aim is to
uncover the importance placed on fairness independently of
beliefs about what the other player’s actions might be; such
beliefs might, in turn, affect one’s own actions. It is, however,
just such interactions and such beliefs about others’ intentions
that preoccupy other chapters (Camerer, Sanfey, and Dorris).
A quite distinct set of brain regions, near the paracingulate and
posterior superior temporal sulcus, are called into play when
subjects attempt to adopt another person’s perspective and
estimate the decisions that they will take or the influence that
their own decisions will have on the other person.
An attempt to place social preferences in the broader context
of the behavior of other primate species is made by Brosnan and
by Silk. Like humans, some other primates show evidence of
aversion to unfair decisions that leave themselves at a disadvan-
tage. By contrast, evidence that other primates place a premium
on fairness even when it leaves them relatively disadvantaged,
is limited. There is, however, evidence that chimpanzees will
assist others in obtaining desired outcomes in situations when
such actions impose little cost on themselves (Warneken et al.,
2007).
It has now been seven years since a special issue of Neuron
allowed neuroscientists to present theoretical reviews which
have become mainstays of the discipline. This issue intro-
duced many to the entwined connections between dopamine
release, motivation, formal learning theory, economic games,
and ecology. It is therefore somewhat surprising that the last of152 Neuron 63, July 30, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.these—behavioral ecology—a discipline that also investigates
why animals choose what they do using normative modeling,
but in the context of evolutionary constraints, is one of the
few topics given less direct attention. As pointed out in the chap-
ters by Gallistel and by Santos and Chen, there is a tacit assump-
tion in Neuroeconomics that a nonhuman animal’s individual
economy—decisions concerning factors such as nutrition,
safety, reproduction—can be understood by reference to human
economics.
However, the influence may also be in the opposite direction:
given that the human brain is the product of evolution, might we
gain clues to help inform neuroeconomic theorizing by consid-
ering how the brains of mammals have been shaped by the
environments they are required to negotiate? For instance, risk
preferences in animals are strongly shaped by motivational
state and overall reward rate rather than consistently directed
toward risk-seeking or -averse behaviors (cf. Platt and Huettel,
2008) as assumed by some economic approaches (chapter by
Weber and Johnson). Similarly, economic models often assume
that costs discount benefits uniformly regardless of their source.
Nonetheless, there is now good neural and behavioral evidence
that costs such as the delay between a choice and its conse-
quences or the amount of work required to obtain a goal are
weighed up differently (Rudebeck et al., 2006; Stevens et al.,
2005).
Whether Neuroeconomics will work as a course textbook is
unclear. Unlike most textbooks, several chapters cover similar
material and the linear development of argument and idea is
not always apparent in the ordering of chapters. For example,
discussions of topics of broad interest, such as prospect theory,
reinforcement learning theory, and social preference, appear in
several chapters, and figures summarizing the same experiment,
data, or idea appear in more than one place. For many readers,
however, the differences in perspectives on these key issues
will be illuminating. Moreover, the coauthored chapters, often
written by contributors with quite different specializations, ensure
that the accessibility of the material is exemplary (for example,
Fox and Poldrack, with backgrounds in behavioral economics
and neuroimaging, provide an outstanding introduction to Pros-
pect Theory).
Perhaps most importantly, Neuroeconomics manages to
convey why neuroscientists in this field are excited by what their
colleagues in anthropology and economics have to tell them.
Regardless of whether or not the name ‘‘neuroeconomics’’
prevails into the future as the title of an autonomous discipline,
it is clear that the approaches to decision making outlined in
Neuroeconomics are likely to make their influence felt for some
time to come.
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